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Punitive Damages in Survival Actions:
Froud v. Celotex Corp.
INTRODUCTION
At common law, the death of either the victim or the tortfeasor
extinguished any cause of action accruing prior to the victim's
death.1 Recognizing the injustice inherent in this rule,2 the
Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois Survival Act ("Survival Act").3
The Survival Act enables the decedent's representative to con-
tinue the victim's claim after his death.4 By the same token, if
the wrongdoer dies, his estate remains responsible for his torts.5
Initially, courts interpreted the Survival Act narrowly, refus-
ing to allow a decedent's estate to utilize the remedies which
would have been available to the victim had he lived. 6 Eventu-
ally, courts abandoned many of these early restrictions, and, in
1974, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that the Survival Act
1. This rule, known as the abatement doctrine, originated in England, and was sub-
sequently adopted by American courts. For commentary on the history of the abatement
doctrine, see generally 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302; 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, HIs-
TORY OF ENGLAND LAw 333-36 (3d ed. 1923); Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker
v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431 (1960); Winfield, Death As Affecting Liability in Tort, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 239 (1929). Discussion of the abatement doctrine in Illinois appears in
McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966); Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571
(1928); Bunker v. Green, 48 Ill. 243 (1868).
2. The common law abatement rule is the source of the old adage that it is cheaper to
kill a person rather than to merely injure him. Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61
Ill. 2d 31, 35, 330 N.E.2d 509, 513 (1975). See also McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d at 494,
216 N.E.2d at 144, wherein the Illinois Supreme Court declared that "there is no reason
why an estate that has been injured or depleted by the wrong of another should not be
compensated whether the injured is living or not." Id.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, 27-6 (1981). See infra note 19 for the text of the Survival
Act.
4. See, e.g., Jones v. Siesennop, 55 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1042, 371 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1977)
(allowing a cause of action against an attorney for professional negligence to survive the
death of the plaintiff).
5. See, e.g., Illinois Minerals Co. v. McCarthy, 318 Ill. App. 423, 434-37, 48 N.E.2d 424,
427-28 (1943) (allowing an action for fraud and deceit to continue against the defendant's
estate).
6. See, e.g., Jones v. Barmm, 217 Ill. 381, 382, 75 N.E. 505, 506 (1905) (an action for
tortious interference of a business not allowed under the Survival Act); Holton v. Daly,
106 Ill. 131, 141 (1882) (damages for pain and suffering not recoverable after the victim's
death).
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does provide full recovery to the victim's estate for all damages
suffered by the victim.7
In Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co.,8 the Illinois Supreme
Court further interpreted the Survival Act as being solely com-
pensatory in nature, therefore precluding recovery of punitive
damages. The court did allow punitive damages, however, in a
subsequent case brought under the Survival Act, National Bank
of Bloomington v. Norfolk &'Western Railway.9 In this case, the
defendent had violated a-statute which specifically authorized
recovery of punitive damages. The court stated that its prior
denial of punitive damages in common law claims did not pre-
vent a plaintiff from recovering such damages when the claim
was based on a statute allowing punitive damages. 10 In addi-
tion, in apparent retreat from its earlier holding in Mattya-
sousky, the court stated that the Survival Act neither authorizes
nor prohibits punitive damages.1'
In Froud v. Celotex Corp.,' 2 the Illinois Supreme Court consid-
ered whether to extend its holding in National Bank to allow
punitive damages in common law actions brought under the
Survival Act. The court held that Mattyasovsky continued as
controlling precedent for the denial of punitive damages in
common law claims after the victim's death, 3 and that such
damages are recoverable only under certain statutory causes of
action, such as the one involved in National Bank. 4
This note will examine the history of the Survival Act, tracing
the development of the Illinois Supreme Court's earlier, more re-
strictive interpretations of the statute to the modern view that
the Survival Act provides nearly full recovery to a decedent's
estate. Next considered is the court's decision to exclude punitive
damages from this recovery. Froud v. Celotex Corp. will be ana-
lyzed in light of the Survival Act, the court's distinction between
7. Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill. 2d. 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974). See infra notes
39-42 and accompanying text.
8. 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975). See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
9. 73 Iil. 2d 60, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978). In this case, the defendant violated the Illinois
Public Utilities Act, which authorizes punitive damages for willful and wanton conduct.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-213, 1 7 (1981). See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
10. 73 111. 2d at 65, 383 N.E.2d at 924.
11. Id.
12. 98 Ill. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983).
13. Id. at 335, 456 N.E.2d at 136.
14. Id.
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statutory and common law claims, and courts' objectives in
awarding punitive damages. Finally, this note will discuss the
possible impact of Froud on Illinois tort law.
BACKGROUND
The Illinois Survival Act
At common law, the death of either the victim or the tortfeasor
extinguished all tort liability, thereby precluding successful lit-
igation under any cause of action accruing prior to the victim's
death. 15 Courts reasoned that a tort action was a personal right
which died with the victim, 16 rationalizing the abatement of the
action on the grounds that one key purpose of tort law, punish-
ment of the defendant, could no longer be accomplished once the
defendant had died. 17
Allowing the death of a party to extinguish a valid cause of
action eventually came to be viewed as both harsh and illogi-
cal.' 8 In 1872, the Illinois legislature responded to thes&-criti-
cisms by adopting the Illinois Survival Act, which allows claims
to continue after a party's death.1 9 If a victim dies, his estate
may assert any cause of action which accrued prior to his death,
15. See Davis v. Moore, 103 Ill. 445 (1882); Brown v. Parker, 15 Ill. 307 (1853). See also
supra note 1.
16. See Gilmer v. Eubank, 13 Ill. 271 (1851). Blackstone justified the rule on the
ground that the executor of a plaintiff has not suffered any manner of wrong or injury. 3
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302. This rationale has been severely criticized. While
tort actions abated at common law, contract actions, which are often equally personal in
nature, were held to survive the death of either party. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 126, at 898 (4th ed. 1971). Examples of contract actions which survived the
death of a party at common law include Foreman State Trust & Say. Bank v. Tauber, 348
Ill. 280, 180 N.E. 827 (1931) (allowing a claim on an antenuptial agreement to survive the
husband's death); Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Ill. 362,161 N.E. 756 (1928) (allowing an action
for specific performance to convey land to survive the death of the grantor).
17. See McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966). See also F. POLLACK,
THE LAW OF TORTS 62-65 (13th ed. 1929).
18. See supra note 2.
19. Illinois has had a survival statute since 1829, but the cause of action has had
application to personal injuries only since 1872. With but a single modification covering
dram shop actions, the survival statute remains today in the form it took nearly 100
years ago. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, 27-6 historical note (Smith-Hurd 1976). The Survi-
val Act provides:
In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following
also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover damages for an injury to the
person (except slander and libel), actions to recover damages for an injury to
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and any damages recovered are part of the decedent's probate
estate.20 If the wrongdoer dies, his estate is responsible for torts
committed prior to his death.21 Illinois was one of the first states
to adopt a survival statute; today all jurisdictions have aban-
doned the abatement doctrine to some extent.22
The Survival Act should not be confused with the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act.23 If a tortfeasor causes the victim's death,
the Wrongful Death Act provides a cause of action for the vic-
tim's next of kin to recover pecuniary damages such as funeral
expenses and monetary contributions which they might have
expected to receive if the victim's death had not intervened.24 The
Survival Act enables the victim's cause of action to continue
after his death through the administrator of his estate in order to
recover damages suffered by the victim before his death. The
Wrongful Death Act provides the victim's next of kin with a
means of recovery, whereas the Survival Act continues the vic-
tim's own cause of action.25
The enactment of the Survival Act has not resulted in a com-
plete abandonment of the common law abatement doctine in
Illinois. Several causes of action still die with the victim or tort-
real or personal property or for the detention or conversion of personal property,
actions against officers for misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance of them-
selves or their deputies, actions for fraud or deceit, and actions provided in Sec-
tion 14 of Article VI of "An Act relating to alcoholic liquors."
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, 27-6 (1981).
20. Jones v. Siesennop, 55 Il. App. 3d 1037, 1042, 371 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1977); Wether-
all v. Chicago City R.R, 104 11. App. 357,361 (1902).
21. Wehr v. Brooks, 21 Ill. App. 115, 115 (1886); McCrory v. Hamilton, 39 111. App. 490,
491 (1881).
22. The scope of other states' survival acts vary considerably from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. For an overview of various survival acts see W. PROSSER, supra note 16,
§§ 126, 127; J. STEiN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACIONS
§ 265 (1972); Livingston, Survival of Tort Actions: A Proposal for California Legislation,
37 CAL W.L. REV. 63 (1949).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 1, 2 (1981).
24. The Wrongful Death Act states that the "amount recovered in every such action
shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased
person." Id., 1, 2. For a discussion of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act see Rusher v.
Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894-96, 388 N.E.2d 906, 910-12 (1979); Giffy v. Tolliver, 64 111.
App. 3d 504, 506-08, 381 N.E.2d 755, 757-58 (1978); Demos, Measure of Damages for
Wrongful Death, 60 ILL B.J. 5181 (1972).
25. Lyons v. Whittington, 109 Ill. App. 3d 197, 440 N.E.2d 335 (1982). For commentary
on the distinction between the Survival Act and the Wrongful Death Act see Hurley,
Matter of Life and Death: A Discussion of the Interaction of the Survival Statute and the
Wrongful Death Act in Illinois, 60 ILL B.J. 376 (1972); Note, Death of the Abatement
Doctrine, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 608 (1975).
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feasor. For example, the Survival Act specifically prohibits suits
for libel and slander.26 The courts have also limited the scope of
the Survival Act by holding that entirely personal torts, such as
malicious prosecution 27 and false imprisonment,28 still abate
upon death.
The recent trend among Illinois courts, however, is not to re-
strict, but to expand the remedies available under the Survival
Act.29 For example, early Illinois decisions limited property
damages to injuries to goods and chattels, excluding intangible
property interests.30 Later courts rejected this narrow construc-
tion, and actions to recover damages to intangible property such
as wrongful death actions, 31 attorney malpractice,3 2 and breach
of fiduciary duty,33 all survive.
Courts also have prohibited actions under the Survival Act if
the victim has died as a result of the defendant's tortious con-
duct.3 4 This prohibition resulted from the courts' interpretation
of the Survival Act and the Wrongful Death Act as mutually
exclusive remedies. 35 Although a victim may have a cause of
action for damages he incurred prior to his death, such as loss of
wages or pain and suffering, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Hol-
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110-1/2, 27-6 (1981). See supra note 19 for the text of the Survi-
val Act.
27. See, e.g., Kent v. Muscarello, 9 Ill. App. 3d 738, 293 N.E.2d 6 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Gilbert, 22 111. App. 568 (1887).
29. See Jones v. Siesonnop, 55 Ill. App. 2d 1037, 1041, 371 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1977).
(Survival Act is remedial in nature, and should be liberally construed). Illinois' expansion
of its Survival Act is consistent with the broad reading given survival acts in other juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Ivey v. Wiggins, 276 Ala. 106, 159 So. 2d 618 (1964) (action for aliena-
tion of affections survives the death of the plaintiff). According to Prosser,
[Tihe modem trend is definitely toward the view that tort causes of action and
liabilities are as fairly part of the estate of either the plaintiff or defendant as
contract debts, and that the question is rather one of why a fortuitous event
such as death should extinguish a valid action. Accordingly, survival statutes
gradually are being extended; and it may be expected that ultimately all tort
actions will survive to the same extent as those founded on contract.
W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 126.
30. See, e.g., Shedd v. Patterson, 312 Ill. 371, 144 N.E. 5 (1923); Jones v. Barmm, 217
Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 505 (1905).
31. See McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 111. 2d at 494, 216 N.E.2d at 144.
32. See Jones v. Siesonnop, 55 II. 2d at 1042, 371 N.E.2d at 896.
33. See McGill v. Lazzaro, 62 111. App. 3d 151, 152, 379 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1978).
34. See Wilcox v. International Harvester, 278 Ill. 465, 116 N.E. 141 (1917); Holton v.
Daly, 106111. 131 (1882).
35. Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. at 140. See supra notes 24-25. See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 16, §§ 126, 127.
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ton v. Daly,36 held that actions for these damages abated upon
the victim's death, leaving actions for wrongful death by the
decedent's dependents as the exclusive remedy. 37
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled Holton v. Daly
in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.,3 8 stating that the remedy provided
by Holton was "grievously incomplete." 39 In order to provide full
and complete recovery, the court declared that damages for pain
and suffering and loss of wages incurred by the victim prior to
his death pass to his estate under the Survival Act.40 The court
also stated that it was an obvious injustice to shield a defendant
from a portion of the damages he caused when it was his con-
duct which resulted in the death of the victim. 41 In this circum-
stance, a defendant could be faced with an action under the Sur-
vival Act by the decedent's estate, as well as a wrongful death
action by the decedent's beneficiaries. 42
Despite these advances in protecting the victim's legal rights,
punitive damages may not be awarded under the Survival Act
after the tortfeasor's death.43 While the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is to punish the defendant and to deter him and others from
committing these acts in the future,44 little punishment or deter-
36. 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
37. Id. at 141. The supreme court's construction of the Survival Act and the Wrongful
Death Act as mutually exclusively remedies persisted for more than 80 years. E.g., Suse-
miehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 376 Ill. 138, 33 N.E.2d 211 (1941); Wilcox v. International
Harvester, 278 Il. 465, 116 N.E. 151 (1917).
38. 56 111. 2d 427, 308 N.E.2d 583(1974).
39. Id. at 431,308 N.E.2d at 587. In Murphy, the plaintiffs decedent was burned while
having his truck filled with gasoline, and died nine days later from the injury. The dece-
dent's widow brought an action under the Wrongful Death Act for loss of wages, and
under the Survival Act for the pain and suffering of her husband during the nine day
period from his injury to death.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. For an analysis of Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., see Note, supra note 25, at 608.
For a discussion of allocating damages when both a survival action and wrongful death
action are brought, see W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 127.
43. Although punitive damages have been denied under the Survival Act for more
than 100 years, the origin of this proposition is somewhat unclear. The earliest Supreme
Court decision citing this rule is Conant v. Griffin, 48 111. 410 (1868), a case which did not
involve a verdict awarding punitive damages.
44. Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 11. 192, 197, 131 N.E.2d 675,677 (1921). For commentary
on the history and justification of punitive damages, see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICES § 9.10 (1981); W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 127; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957). The public policy considerations of punitive damages
are discussed infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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rence can be achieved by imposing punitive damages on the
defendant's estate. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions deny punitive damages in survival actions brought
after the tortfeasor's death.45
Illinois, however, has gone one step further. In Mattyasovsky
v. West Towns Bus Co.,46 the Illinois Supreme Court held that if
the victim dies, his estate may not recover punitive damages in a
common law tort action. The court reasoned that the Survival
Act was solely compensatory in nature, and thus provided recov-
ery only for the actual physical and mental injury suffered by
the victim prior to his death. 47 The court labeled punitive dam-
ages a "windfall to the plaintiff. ' 48 Since the Survival Act was
exclusively remedial in nature, the court concluded that punitive
damages could not be recovered after the victim's death. 49
The court allowed punitive damages, however, in a statutory
cause of action brought under the Survival Act in National Bank
of Bloomington v. Norfolk & Western Railway.50 The court rea-
45. See, e.g., Braun v. Moreno, 11 Ariz. App. 509, 466 P.2d 60(1970); Evans v. Gibson,
220 Cal. 476, 31 P.2d 389 (1934); Allen v. Anderson, 93 Nev. 204, 562 P.2d 487 (1977);
McAdams v. Blue, 3 N.C. App. 169, 164 S.E.2d 490 (1968); Morriss v. Barton, 200 Okla. 4,
190 P.2d 451 (1947); Hayes v. Gill, 216 Tenn. 39, 390 S.W.2d 213 (1965); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Dalton v. Johnson, 204 Va. 102, 129
S.E.2d 647 (1963); Marcante v. Hein, 51 Wyo. 389,67 P.2d 196 (1937).
46. 61 M. 2d 31, 32-34, 330 N.E.2d 509, 510, 512 (1975). In Illinois, punitive damages
are also prohibited in wrongful death actions. See Winter v. Schneider Tank Lines, 107
Ill. App. 3d 767, 483 N.E.2d 490 (1982).
47. The court viewed the statute's language allowing actions for "an injury to the
person" as pertaining only to compensatory damages, and excluding punitive damages.
61111. 2d at 34, 330 N.E.2d at 510. For a discussion of this interpretation, see Note, supra
note 25, at 608.
48. 61 Ill. 2d at 36, 3 0 N.E.2d at 512. The supreme court also expressed a reluctance
to impose punitive damages on the defendant, since the defendant did not personally
injure the victim but was being held responsible on grounds of vicarious liability. Id. at
32, 34, 330 N.E.2d at 510, 512.
49. Id. at 37, 330 N.E.2d at 512. The majority's holding was sharply criticized by Jus-
tice Goldenhersh, who stated in his dissent that
[A] construction of our survival statute which did not preclude recovery of puni-
tive damages would once and for all put to rest the old adage that it is cheaper
to kill your victim than to leave him maimed. In addition to deterring others
from willful and wanton misconduct, it would bring death actions into complete
harmony with the general body of law governing other types of tortious
conduct."
Id. at 35, 330 N.E. at 513 (Goldhersh, J., dissenting).
50. 73 M1. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978). In a companion case, Churchill v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., 73 111. 2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978), the supreme court also awarded punitive
damages for a violation of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, ILL REV. STAT., ch 111-213,
77 (1981).
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soned that its previous decision in Mattyasovsky to deny puni-
tive damages in a common law claim did not abate a defendant's
statutory liability for punitive damages. 51 In National Bank, the
defendant railroad had violated the Public Utilities Act, which
expressly authorizes the recovery of punitive damages. 52 Even
though the administrator of the victim's estate brought the
action after the victim's death, the court reasoned that punitive
damages should be awarded in order to fulfill the regulatory
scheme of the Public Utilities Act.53
The National Bank court did not address the issue of whether
its holding should be extended to allow punitive damages in
common law actions under the Survival Act.54 It did, however,
appear to retreat from its earlier interpretation in Mattyasovsky
that the Survival Act was purely compensatory in nature.55 The
National Bank court stated that the Survival Act itself neither
authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages; it is merely the vehi-
cle by which the cause of action survives the death of the injured
person when the action would otherwise have abated at common
law.56 The court further stated that punitive damages should not
be affected by the subsequent death of the injured person.5 7
Because the court limited its holding in National Bank to stat-
utory actions, however, Illinois courts, as well as federal courts
applying Illinois law, continued to follow Mattyasovsky in deny-
ing punitive damages in common law tort actions.58 The broad
language of the supreme court in National Bank that the act
51. 73 JIl. 2d at 173,383 N.E.2d at 924.
52. The Public Utilities Act states, in pertinent part, that "if the court shall find that
the act or omission was wilful, the court may in addition to the actual damages, award
damages for the sake of example and by the way of punishment." ILL. REV. STAT. ch
111-2/3, 77 (1981).
53. 73 Ill. 2d at 174, 383 N.E.2d at 924. The Illinois Public Utilities Act was enacted to
secure the public's protection at the intersection of streets and railroads. See Churchill v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 127, 137, 383 N.E.2d 929, 933 (1978).
54. Justice Ryan, however, found no distinction between common law and statutory
claims for punitive damages, stating that "if the language is not broad enough to permit
the survival of a cause of action for common law punitive damages, then it is likewise not
broad enough to permit the survival of a statutory cause of action for punitive damages."
Id. at 178, 383 N.E.2d at 926 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
55. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
56. 73 111. 2d at 174, 383 N.E. at 924.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Hamrick v. Lewis, 515 F.
Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Neuman. v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. App. 3d 907, 443 N.E.2d
626 (1983).
[Vol. 15630
Froud v. Celotex Corp.
neither authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages thus made it
inevitable that Mattyasovsky would soon be challenged.
FROUD V. CELOTEX CORPORATION
Factual Background
The plaintiff, Froud, contracted cancer from his long on-the-job
exposure to asbestos-filled materials.59 His action was based on
common law negligence, as well as strict liability in tort. Named
as defendants were more than twenty companies that had mined,
manufactured, or distributed asbestos or asbestos-filled
materials. 60
The plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages
based upon the defendants' disregard for the health and safety
of their workers. The complaint alleged that the defendants had
conspired to prevent publication of medical reports and other
documents which showed the harmful effects of asbestos.61
Before the case could be tried, the plaintiff died from can-
cer.62 The complaint was then amended, naming his widow as
plaintiff under the Survival Act, and adding counts for wrongful
death. Defendants moved to strike the punitive damages counts,
contending that such damages were not recoverable after the
death of the victim. The trial court, with great reluctance, con-
strued Mattyasovsky63 as binding precedent, and dismissed the
punitive damages counts. The judge stated that "as a matter of
59. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982), rev'd, 98 Ill. 2d
324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983).
60. Defendants named in Froud were A & M Insulation Co., AARCO Prods. Corp.,
Armstrong World Indus., Combustion Eng'g, Celotex Corp., Eagle-Picher Indus., Fibre-
board Corp., The Flintkote Co., Gaf Corp., Grant Wilson, Inc., H.K. Porter Co., Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., Keene Corp., Mauritzon, Inc., Nicolet Indus., Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., Owens-Illinois, Inc., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., Raymark Inc., Ryder Cement, Standard Asbestos, Inc., and UNARCO Indus. Id.
61. The plaintiff in Froud contracted a form of cancer known as mesothelioma.
Mesothelioma is a form of a malignant tumor of the chest and lungs which may also
effect the abdomen. Extraordinarily painful and always fatal, it is a relatively rare form
of cancer, whose relationship to asbestos has generally been known by the asbestos
industry since the late 1930's. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 403 F.2d 1076,
1083-85 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 869 (1974); Note, Asbestos Litigation: The
Dust Has Yet To Settle, 7 FORDH" URB. UJ. 55, 59-61 (1978).
62. 98111. 2d at 329,456 N.E.2d at 133.
63. Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 507 (1975). See
supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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law what I have done is right. As a matter of justice, what I am
doing is wrong."64
On appeal, Froud was consolidated with two other asbestos
cases in which punitive damages also had been denied.6 5 Con-
fronting the appellate court was the issue of whether the supreme
court's allowance of punitive damages in National Bank66 was
limited to statutory actions, or whether the holding extended to
common law actions as well. The appellate court agreed with the
National Bank court's interpretation of the Survival Act as a
neutral vehicle which neither authorizes nor prohibits punitive
damages. The appellate court also found no apparent basis for
distinguishing between statutory actions and common law
claims.6 7 The court concluded that if the victim's estate could
recover statutory punitive damages, the estate should be able to
recover these damages under a common law claim as well.68
The Supreme Court Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court, holding that the Survival Act does not allow
common law claims for punitive damages to survive the victim's
death.69 The court declared that its granting of punitive dam-
ages in National Bank did not overrule the precedent set forth in
Mattyasovsky denying punitive damages in common law
claims.70 Since the action in Froud was a common law negli-
gence claim, the court dismissed the count for punitive damages,
and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether
the defendants were liable for compensatory damages. 71
64. Transcript of Proceedings before Judge Paul Elward, Nov. 25, 1980, at 12-13.
65. One of the suits had been filed by the victim before his death. The other worker
died before filing an action, and his administrator brought an action on behalf of his
estate through the Survival Act. Froud, 9811l. 2d at 329, 456 N.E.2d at 133.
66. National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 111. 2d 160, 383 N.E. 2d 919
(1978).
67. Froud, 107 m. App. 3d at 657,437 N.E. 2d at 913.
68. Id. The Fourth District of the Appellate Court of Illinois allowed punitive damages
in a common law action under the Survival Act in Howe v. Clark Equip. Co., 104 111. App.
3d 45, 432 N.E.2d 621 (1982). In allowing the claim for punitive damages, the court rea-
soned that if "statutory causes of action for punitive damages survive, by extension of
logic there is no bar to similar common law causes of action." Id. at 49, 432 N.E. 2d at
625.
69. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 m. 2d 324, 456 N.E. 2d 131 (1983).
70. Id. at 330,456 N.E.2d at 138.
71. Id. at 338, 456 N.E.2d at 137.
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The Froud court reconciled its previous holdings in
Mattyasovsky and National Bank, citing with approval the lan-
guage in Mattyasovsky emphasizing the compensatory nature of
recovery authorized by the Survival Act.7 2 Since the statute
allows "actions to recover damages for an injury to the per-
son,"7 3 the court reasoned that recovery could not exceed the
physical and mental injuries sustained by the victim. 74 No mat-
ter now outrageous a defendant's conduct, punitive damages are
not recoverable in common law claims after the victim's death.75
The court distinguished Mattyasovsky from National Bank by
explaining that it allowed punitive damages in National Bank
because this remedy was an "integral component" of the statute
which had been violated by the defendant.7 6 Thus, to hold that
punitive damages abate upon the victim's death would contra-
vene the statute's purpose of deterring willful and wanton con-
duct and promoting public safety.77
The Froud court also confronted the potential unfairness of
having common law claims for punitive damages hinge solely
on whether the victim survives the trial. While acknowledging
this inequity, the court concluded that any expansion of the Sur-
vival Act is the responsibility of the legislature, and not the
courts.7 8 The court added that allowing punitive damages in
Froud would serve as an injustice to the plaintiffs whose claims
for punitive damages had been dismissed by courts relying on
Mattyasovsky as controlling precedent. 79
72. Id. at 330, 456 N.E.2d at 134.
73. ILL REV. STAT. ch 110-1/2, 27-6 (1981).
74. 98 Ill. 2d at 330, 456 N.E.2d at 134.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 331-33, 456 N.E.2d at 134-36. An apparent factor in the National Bank
court's decision to allow punitive damages was that the statute violated by the defendant
contained a clause authorizing this recovery. National Bank, 73 Ill. 2d at 174-75, 383
N.E.2d at 924. There are but a few statutes in Illinois which authorize recovery of puni-
tive damages. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 14-6 (1981) (allows punitive damages to be
awarded in eavesdropping cases); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, 138.19(k) (1981) (permits up to
an additional 50% of the compensation otherwise available under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act for "any unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment or intentional
underpayment of compensation").
77. 9811. 2d at 332-33,456 N.E.2d at 134-35.
78. Id. at 335-36, 456 N.E.2d at 136-37. In deferrence to the legislature, the court noted
that a bill was introduced in the General Assembly, but defeated in committee, which
would have specifically provided punitive damages in actions under the Survival Act. See
2 FINAL LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1975 SESSION OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS 1188.
79. 98 Ill. 2d at 337, 456 N.E.2d at 137. The court cited the following cases as relying
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ANALYSIS
Interpretation of the
Survival Act
The Illinois Supreme Court in Froud interpreted the Survival
Act as being purely compensatory in nature, thereby precluding
claims for punitive damages. The language of the Survival Act,
however, places no express bar on punitive damages. It merely
states that the victim's cause of action will continue after his
death,80 and is silent as to the availability of damages.81 While,
in Mattyasovsky, 2 the court construed the Survival Act as
implicitly excluding claims for punitive damages, in National
Bank the same court acknowledged that the Survival Act neither
authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages.8 3
on Mattyasovsky: Hamrick v. Lewis, 515 F. Supp. 983, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Illinois law is
clear that punitive damages cannot be recovered under the Survival Act); In re Johns-
Manville Asbestos Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (counts for punitive
damages under the Survival Act dismissed).
80. See supra note 19 for the language of the Illinois Survival Act.
81. A majority of other jurisdictions whose survival acts are also silent regarding
punitive damages have allowed this remedy through judicial decision. See, e.g., White v.
B.K. Trucking Co., 371 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Okla. 1974); Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424
(N.D. Iowa 1967); Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd,
400 F.2d 857 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969); Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407
P.2d 917 (1965); Mode v. Barnett, 235 Ark. 641, 361 S.W.2d 525 (1962); Dunwoody v. Tap-
nell, 47 Cal. App. 3d 367, 120 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1975); Swartz v. Rosenkrans, 78 Colo. 167,
240 P. 333 (1925); Reynolds v. Willis, 58 Del. 368, 209 A.2d 760 (1965); Martin v. United
Sec. Serv., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975); Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149,
297 A.2d 721 (1972); State ex rel. Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1973); Kern v.
Kegan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967); Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St. 2d 20, 374
N.E.2d 411 (1978); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Worrie v. Boze,
198 Va. 891, 96 S.E.2d 799 (1957); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d
437 (1980).
Most other juridictions prohibit punitive damages only when the relevant statute
explicitly denies this form of recovery. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 41, § 9.10.
New York and Rhode Island are two states whose survival statutes specifically prohibit
punitive damages. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusrS LAW § 11-3-2 (Consol. 1979); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-1-8 (1970). Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington do not allow
punitive damages in any action. See Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.)
(applying Massachusetts law), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Killebrew v. Abbott
Laboratories, 359 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La. 1978); Wilfrong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St.
Ry., 129 Neb. 600, 607, 262 N.W. 537, 540 (1935); Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894,
897, 246 P.2d 853,855 (1952).
82. Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31,37,330 N.E.2d 509,512 (1975).
83. National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 160,174,383 N.E. 2d
919, 933 (1978).
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The Mattyasovsky court based its decision on the statute's
express statement that "injuries to the person" survive. 84 No
legislative history exists interpreting this phrase, but jurisdic-
tions with survival statutes containing similar language have
not interpreted this phrase as barring recovery of punitive dam-
ages. Most courts have interpreted this language as indicating
simply that personal and property actions survive.8 5
When a claim survives the victim's death, it should continue
with all the remedies that claim may provide, including punitive
damages. The Survival Act operates only as a conduit for pass-
ing the decedent's cause of action to his estate; it does not
change the substance of that claim.86 The decedent's representa-
tive is still subject to the same statute of limitations as though
the victim had lived to pursue the claim.87 The representative
84. Mattyasovsky, 61 Ill. 2d at 34, 330 N.E. 2d at 510.
85. The Wisconsin survival statute is very similar to the Illinois statute, and states in
pertinent part: "In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law the
following shall also survive ... assault and battery, false imprisonment, invasion of
privacy ... or other damage to the person ...... WIs. STAT. §§ 895.01 (1976). The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court found no limitation on punitive damages or any other remedy in
Wisconsin's survival act, stating that the language merely described the causes of action
which survive. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 311, 294 N.W.2d 437, 463
(1980). See also Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (refusing
to interpret Pennsylvania's survival act as prohibiting punitive damages); Atlas Proper-
ties Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969) (allowing punitive damages under Florida's
survival statute).
86. The supreme court recognized that the Survival Act does not create a new cause of
action, but is merely a vehicle to maintain the existing cause of action. National Bank v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 160, 197, 383 N.E.2d 919, 933 (1978). The Survival Act was
described as a "conduit" for an existing cause of action in Howe v. Clark Equip. Co., 104
Ill. App. 3d 45, 50,432 N.E.2d 621, 625 (1982). One commentator has stated:
With the rule of abatement neutralized as to the causes of action mentioned in
the Survival Act, the personal representative steps into the shoes of the
deceased and should recover exactly what the deceased would have recovered
had he lived. To permit the personal representative to recover compensatory
damages while refusing to permit him to recover punitive damages is to permit
the personal representative to step into only one of the decedent's shoes.
Note, Punitive Damages in Survival Actions, 7 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 811, 826 (1976).
87. McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 542 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1982). This
case was similar to Froud in that it was also a products liability action filed by the
estates of deceased asbestos workers. In interpreting Illinois law, the court held that if
the employees knew they were wrongfully injured, the fact that representatives who later
filed survival actions may not have had such knowledge did not preclude the running of
the statute of limitations. Id. at 717. The court stated that the representatives stood in the
shoes of their decedents. Id. at 719. If the "employee's claim would be barred by the two
year statute of limitations so would their representatives' actions under the Survival
Act." Id. at 720.
19841 635
Loyola University Law Journal
must prove the same elements of the claim, and he is subject to
any defenses which could have been raised against the dece-
dent. 8 Similarly, the representative should be able to seek puni-
tive damages if the decedent could have sought this remedy to
death.
Distinction Between Statutory Claims
and Common Law Claims
In Froud, the supreme court indicated that it had allowed pun-
itive damages in National Bank, not because of the Survival Act,
but because the defendant had violated a statute specifically
authorizing such damages.8 9 This reasoning would support re-
covery of punitive damages in the survival of common law
claims as well. Since it is the cause of action rather than the
Survival Act which determines whether punitive damages are
allowable, this remedy should be recoverable in all common law
actions which permit punitive damages.
The Froud court, however, treated the survival of common law
claims differently than the survival of statutory claims. If a
defendant violates a common law cause of action, this remedy is
not available after the victim's death, no matter how egregious
the defendant's conduct.90 If a defendant violates a statute which
specifically authorizes punitive damages, however, this remedy
is available, even if the victim is no longer alive in order to
further the legislative intent to punish reprehensible conduct and
promote public safety.91
The public policy goals of punitive damages would be served
by the survival of punitive damages in common law actions as
well. In Illinois, punitive damages are imposed to punish a de-
fendant for his egregious conduct.92 It is the defendant's out-
88. Jones v. Siesennop, 55 111. App. 3d 1037, 1042, 371 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1977). Since the
survival statutes merely continue the decedent's own cause of action, it is clear that any
defenses which could have been raised against the decedent are available, including con-
tributory negligence, release, and spousal immunity. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 127, at
910.
89. Froud, 98111. 2d at 332-33,456 N.E.2d at 135.
90. Id. at 330, 456 N.E.2d at 134.
91. Id. at 332-33, 456 N.E.2d at 135. For examples of statutes specifically allowing
punitive damages in Illinois, see supra note 76.
92. For a discussion of the purposes of punitive damages in Illinois, see Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI. 2d 172, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978) (punitive damages punish
the wrongdoer and deter the defendant and others from engaging in like conduct in the
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rageous acts that justify imposing punitive damages, not the
choice of the cause of action.93 A defendant should not be shielded
from liability simply because he was fortunate enough to violate
a common law action and to also injure a person who subse-
quently dies.94
Several inequities could result from allowing punitive damages
to depend on the cause of action, rather than the culpability of
the defendant. For example, the Froud decision would prohibit
punitive damage claims from being asserted after the victim's
death in intentional tort suits, since these actions are based on
common law. It is unjust to allow an intentional tortfeasor to be
free from punitive damage liability, while a defendant whose
conduct was merely reckless will be subject to this liability
because his acts violated a statute specifically authorizing such
damages.
Allowing punitive damages in the survival of common law
actions would also promote public safety. By imposing punitive
damages, the defendant and others may be deterred from com-
mitting the same egregious acts in the future.95 In National
Bank, a primary purpose of the statute violated by the defendant
was to protect the public from the outrageous conduct of public
future); Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 710, 450 NE. 2d 1199,
1206 (1983) (since the goal of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, the size of the
award must take into account the egregiousness of the defendant's act); Tolle v. Inter-
state Sys. Truck Lines, 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773, 356 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1976) (imposing
punitive damages on companies for the torts of their employees provides an incentive for
greater selectivity and supervision of employees). See also Chapman, Punitive Damages
in Illinois and Elsewhere, 64 ILL B.J. 636 (1976); Note, Punitive Damages in Illinois:
Review and Reappraisal, 27 DE PAuL L. REV. 571 (1978).
93. See Anvil Inv. Ltd. v. Thornhill Condominiums, 85 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 407 N.E.2d
645 (1980) (allowed punitive damages for violation of an Illinois securities law, stating
that absent a statutory prohibition, punitive damages should be awarded independently
of the cause of action).
94. This view was expressed by the Florida Supreme Court in its decision to allow
punitive damages in actions brought under its survival act. Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Di-
dich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969). The court stated: "[lit is difficult to accept a reasoning
that envisions a person can be punished only for his malicious and reckless actions when
they maim but not for those despicable actions when they kill the victim." Id. at 688. See
also Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 400 F. 2d 857
(3rd Cir. 1968); Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Iowa 1967).
95. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). See also J. GHRARDI
& J. KIRCHER. supra note 44, § 6.07; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Prin-
cipled Approach, 31 HASTINGS UJ. 639 (1980); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Lia-
bility Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976); Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Cases, 6 PEPPERDNE L. REv. 139 (1978).
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utility companies.96 Allowing punitive damages to survive in
common law claims would further serve-the legislature's goal of
promoting public safety by deterring actual and potential viola-
tors of the common law from committing prohibited conduct.
Society's interest in deterring outrageous conduct exists whether
the violation is of common law or of a statute.97
In Froud, the court acknowledged that the arguments for
allowing punitive damages to survive in common law claims
were persuasive.98 The court nevertheless viewed any authoriza-
tion of punitive damage recovery in these claims as the legisla-
ture's responsibility. In its deference to the legislature, the court
noted that a bill which would have authorized recovery of puni-
tive damages in common law survival actions had been defeated
in the General Assembly.99
This should not bar the Illinois Supreme Court from authoriz-
ing the recovery of punitive damages. Recently the court adopted
comparative negligence in its holding in Alvis v. Ribar,100 even
though legislative attempts to adopt this doctrine had failed. In
that case, the court had stated that is the imperative duty of the
courts to remedy injustices in the common law when the legisla-
ture fails to act. 10 1 The Froud court distinguished Alvis on the
grounds that Alvis involved a "judicial pronouncement of a
common law doctrine," while Froud would have involved a
"judicial construction of a statute.' 01 2 The court based this dis-
tinction on its view that the judiciary has considerably less
power to change a statute than a common law rule.10 3
96. National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73111. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919
(1978).
97. For example, punitive damages are used increasingly as a form of consumer pro-
tection in products liability litigation. By imposing punitive damages courts hope to deter
businesses from recklessly disregarding safety in the production, distribution, and sale of
dangerous products. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Il. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969),
aff'd, 46 Il. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970). See also Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 111.
App. 3d 1102, 427 N.E.2d 608 (1981).
98. 981I1. 2d at 335, 456 N.E.2d at 136.
99. See 2 FINAL LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1975 SESSION OF THE SEVENTY-
NINTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS 1188.
100. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 11. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). In abolishing contributory
negligence, the court noted that in a five year period, six bills which would have abol-
ished the doctrine had failed to pass the General Assembly. Id. at 22-23, 421 N.E.2d at
896-97.
101. 85 IlI. 2d at 22-23, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97.
102. 98111. 2d at 336,456 N.E.2d at 137.
103. Id.
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This reasoning fails to recognize that the abatement doctrine
is a common law rather than a statutory rule.10 4 By allowing
punitive damages after a victim's death, the court would further
eradicate a doctrine which was orginally developed by the courts.
It thus would not be a usurpation of legislative power to allow
punitive damages in common law survival actions.
The "Silent Rationale" of Froud
On the other hand, perhaps the Froud holding does not rest on
limitations of the Survival Act, but on the supreme court's desire
to find a means of restricting punitive damages. Although well-
established in Illinois tort law, punitive damages have always
been subject to criticism. 10 5 The quasi-criminal nature of puni-
tive damages, 0 6 their failure to act as an effective deter-
rent, 0 7 and excessive awards 08 are all problems believed to be
inherent in the award of punitive damages. In recognition of
104. See supra notes 1, 2, 15, 16, and accompanying text for a discussion of the com-
mon law abatement doctrine.
105. Many courts preface an award of punitive damages with the caveat that punitive
damages are not a favorite of the law of torts. See, e.g., Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp
Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1971); Glass v. Burkett, 64 Ill. App. 3d 676, 381 N.E.2d 821
(1978). Commentators have also treated punitive damages with ambivalence. See, e.g., D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973); R. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE
LAW OF ToRTs § 204(4) (14th ed. 1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 2.
106. By serving as a punishment, the function of punitive damages is similar to that
of a criminal penalty, and must be strictly administered by the courts. Kelsay v. Motor-
ola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 188, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978). See generally Mallor & Robert,
supra note 95, at 663; Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages
Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 408 (1967).
107. See McKillip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal, 27 DE PAUL
L. REV. 571, 584 (1978); Owen, supra note 95, at 1257.
108. The number of punitive damages awards in civil trial judgments in the courts of
Cook County, Ill. during 1978 and 1979 have been estimated as being, respectively, "four
and two and one-half times as large as the average annual number of punitive damage
judgments from 1959 to 1979." Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S.
CAL L. REV. 123 (1982). Examples of recent large punitive damage awards in Illinois
include: Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 111.
2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) ($10,000 punitive damage award affirmed); Stambaugh v.
International Harvester, 106 Ill. App. 3d, 435 N.E.2d 729 (1982) ($15 million jury verdict
reduced by the trial court judge to $7.5 million and further reduced by the appellate court
to $650,000).
For commentary on excessive punitive damage awards and examples of large awards
in other jurisdictions, see Nelson, Punishment For Profit: An Examination of the Puni-
tive Damage Award in Strict Liability, 18 U. ILL L.F. 377 (1983); Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L
REV. 1 (1982).
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these difficulties, courts have viewed punitive damages with cau-
tion and tend increasingly to strictly limit them.10 9
Although not articulated in the court's opinion, on appeal,
Froud became a battleground for determining whether punitive
damages should be restricted, or even possibly eliminated, in
Illinois.110 Froud presented issues relating to the above criti-
cisms of punitive damages, as well as the propriety of allowing
punitive damages in product liability actions."' Froud provided
a tempting forum for reassessing the role of punitive damages,
particularly in light of the thousands of asbestos cases filed
across the country seeking both compensatory and punitive
damages'1 2 and the financial instability of several of the defend-
109. Courts apply a variety of procedures to control punitive damages, including dis-
covery, pretrial rulings, remittitur, and reversal on appeal. A discussion of these proce-
dures appears in Owen, supra note 108, at 50. See also Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Co. L. REv. 1 (1982).
For an excellent discussion of factors Illinois courts consider in determining whether a
punitive damage award is excessive see Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 114 Il.
App. 3d 703, 450 N.E.2d 1199 (1983). The court stated these factors include the nature and
enormity of the wrong, the financial status of the defendant, and the possibility of the
defendant facing multiple punitive damage claims for the same wrong. Id. at 712-15, 450
N.E.2d at 1207-08.
110. Brief for Appellant 20-32; Brief for Appellee 13-18; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Avia-
tion Safety Inst. 7-14; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Illinois Trial Lawyers Assoc. 27-38, Froud
v. Celotex Corp., 98 111. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983).
111. A manufacturer who recklessly manufactures a defective product could poten-
tially face thousands of claims by consumers for punitive damages. The greatest fear of
those questioning the use of punitive damages in products liability actions is that multi-
ple awards could bankrupt defendant manufacturers. See In re Northern Dist. of Calif.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1967); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); W.
PROSSER, supra note 16, § 2, at 13; Olick, Chapter 11-A Dubious Solution to Massive
Tort Liability, 18 U. ILL. L.F. 361 (1983); Owen, supra note 108, at 50; Seltzer, Punitive
Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing The Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and
Control, 18 Fordham L. Rev. 37 (1983); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages
Overkill, 30 HASTlNGS L.J. 1797 (1979).
112. As of March 1983, approximately 16,500 claimants had initiated lawsuits across
the country alleging injury from exposure to asbestos. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin,
March 7, 1983, at 1, col. 3. Numerous asbestos suits are expected to be filed throughout
the 1980's and the aggregate number of suits has been projected to reach 45,000. In re
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 11 BANK& CT. DEC. (CRR) 384 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,1984). Puni-
tive damages have already been awarded in several asbestos suits. See Moran v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming a jury award of $350,000 in
compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages); Austin v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., Asb. Lit. Rep. 4044 (D. Me. 1980) (listing punitive damage awards in asbestos
cases).
The potential punitive damage liability faced by the asbestos industry was emphasized
by the defendants in Froud, who had mined, distributed, and manufactured asbestos and
19841 Froud v. Celotex Corp. 641
nts.113 Having expressed its dislike for punitive damages in
Mattyasovsky, the court might have been very receptive to these
criticisms when deciding Froud.1 4 Considering the multitude of
cases filed under the Survival Act in Illinois each year, the stat-
ute could indeed serve as a very effective limitation on punitive
damages." 5
The most obvious effect of this limitation would be the poten-
tial financial savings to defendants. Unless a defendant is
unfortunate enough to violate a statute specifically authorizing
punitive damages, he will be free from this liability if his victim
dies. Furthermore, denying punitive damages may be economi-
cally advantageous to the state. By prohibiting punitive dam-
ages in survival actions, corporations may be more willing to
begin doing business in Illinois, or to increase their existing
activity." 6
asbestos-filled products. See supra note 110. For commentary on the concerns surround-
ing punitive damages raised in Froud and the overall problems of imposing punitive
damages in products liability actions see; Sarrick, Punitive Damages and Asbestos Lit-
igation in Pennsylvania: Punishment or Annihilation?, 87 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1983); Note,
Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Froud v. Celotex Corp., 32 DE PAUL L. REV.
457 (1983).
113. Several of the defendants in Froud had filed for bankruptcy: In re Johns-
Manville Corp., Nos. 82B11656-82B11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re UNR Inds., Nos.
82B9841-82B9851 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982); In re Amatex Corp., No. 82-05220 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1982).
114. The supreme court's dislike for punitive damages has been evident in its other
decisions concerning punitive damages. See Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.
2d 31, 33, 330 N.E. 2d 509, 511 (1975) (punitive damages are a windfall for the plaintiff.);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 187-88, 384 N.E. 2d 358, 360 (1978) (punitive dam-
ages are similar to a criminal penalty and must be strictly controlled by the courts).
115. For example, often asbestos workers do not live long enough to file their own
claims, which are brought by their estates under the Survival Act. Such claimants are
not able to seek punitive damages. See, e.g., In the Matter of Johns-Manville Asbestosis
Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. 111. 1981).
Another recent example of mass tort litigation in Illinois was the 1979 crash of a com-
mercial airliner near Chicago's O'Hare Int'l Airport, where all 271 passengers perished.
After the crash, numerous Wrongful Death Act and Survival Act claims were filed. See In
Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
116. Perhaps the importance of the economic aspects of these cases was most can-
didly stated in In Re Air Crash Disaster, in which the court denied punitive damages in
actions under the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts resulting form the crash of a com-
mercial airliner.
Because Illinois has such strong interests in promoting public safety, it would
have a strong interest in allowing punitive damages to deter corporate miscon-
duct relating to air safety. But because Illinois also has strong interest in hav-
ing airplanes fly in and out of the state, and having related air transportation
companies do business within the state, it would have a strong interest in pro-
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Yet, even assuming that punitive damages should be restricted,
the Survival Act is neither the most logical nor most equitable
means of controlling this remedy. The problems of punitive
damages do not arise only after the death of the victim; they
exist regardless of whether the victim is dead or alive.117 If puni-
tive damages do need limitations, they should also be restricted
in actions brought by the victim, as well as by his representative
after his death.118
Furthermore, it is unjust to allow a defendant who consciously
disregards the safety of others to escape this liability solely
because the victim died before trial. Allowing the availability of
punitive damages to hinge on the victim's lifespan could encour-
age delay tactics by defendants who thus hope to be relieved of
this liability. The denial of punitive damages in survival actions
would therefore not only reward the defendant for his wrong-
doing, but penalize the victim and his estate for delays caused by
the defendants and the court system.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Froud v. Celotex Corp., inter-
preted the Survival Act as being purely compensatory in nature,
tecting air transportation companies by disallowing punitive damages.
644 F.2d at 615, 616.
117. It has been argued that allowing punitive damages if the victim is alive, but
denying this remedy after his death, is so irrational that it violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Hamrick v. Lewis, 515 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill.
1981). The plaintiff in Hamrick challenged the constitutionality of denying punitive
damages in survival and wrongful death actions. The court rejected the challenge, stat-
ing that other federal courts have found no equal protection violation. In a California
case, In Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980), the court also found no equal
protection violation in denying punitive damages in wrongful death actions. The court
stated that barring punitive damages had a rational relation to the legislature's goal of
controlling damages awarded in these actions. Since California had long allowed puni-
tive damages under its survival act, the court did not address the constitutional implica-
tions of denying punitive damages in survival actions.
118. The appellate court in Froud recognized the critics of punitive damages in prod-
ucts liability cases, but did not find sufficient justification for denying punitive damages
after a victim's death. Instead, the court suggested that backbreaking punitive damage
awards could be avoided by the defendants' requesting the trial court to certify a class
action of asbestos claimants for the purpose of resolving the issue of punitive damages.
Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658, 437 N.E.2d, 910, 914 (1982). See also
Justice Sullivan's concurring opinion, in which he urged that the problems of punitive
damages be thoroughly examined. Id. at 659-61, 437 N.E.2d at 914-16 (Sullivan, J.,
concurring).
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thereby precluding the recovery of punitive damages. Yet, the
Survival Act places no limitations on the damages which may
be recovered by the decedent's estate; it merely acts as a conduit
for passing the victim's cause of action to his estate. If the victim
would have recovered punitive damages, then his estate should
be entitled to this remedy.
The Froud court held that punitive damages can be recovered
after the victim's death only if punitive damages are an integral
component of the statute violated by the defendant. There is no
sound basis for distinguishing statutory claims from common
law claims when determining punitive damage recovery. The
purposes of punitive damages, to punish the defendant and pro-
mote public safety, can be served by allowing this remedy in the
survival of common law claims as well.
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